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Abstract 
Industrial investment in Colonial India was segregated by the export industries, such as tea 
and jute that relied on British firms and the import substituting cotton textile industry that 
was dominated by Indian firms. Empirical evidence in this paper does not suggest that 
barriers to entry faced by Indian entrepreneurs created this separation. Informational 
asymmetry played an important role. British entrepreneurs knew the export markets and the 
Indian entrepreneurs were familiar with local markets. Conditional on the initial advantage in 
entry, social network effects determined subsequent entry of firms by ethnicity and created 
separate spheres of industrial investment. 
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Introduction 
Bombay and Calcutta, two metropolitan port cities, experienced very different 
patterns of industrial investment in colonial India. One was the hub of Indian mercantile 
activity and the other the seat of British business. The industries that relied on the export 
market attracted investment from British business groups in the city of Calcutta. Bombay, on 
the other hand, became the center of the import substituting textile industry. Indian cotton 
traders from different communities moved from trade to production of cotton textiles. Few 
British entrepreneurs were present.  British industrial interests exercised monopoly control 
over various industrial activities in Calcutta and the hinterland. British firms were set up in 
tea, jute and coal and here the presence of Indians was minimal. The port cities of Bombay 
and Calcutta became the railway hub in the course of the 19
th
 century as raw materials and 
industrial goods began to be traded out of these cities 
Although geographical factors determined the location of these industries, who 
invested and why remain questions of interest. Cotton was grown in the hinterland of 
Bombay and tea and jute in the hinterland of Calcutta.  History could matter too. Indian 
merchants in Bombay had a strong presence in internal as well in the Indian Ocean trade.  
The trade in raw jute around Calcutta was also in the hands of Indian traders, but these 
traders were not involved in the export trade. A puzzle is why did British and Indian 
investment stay separated? Why did British capital flow into some sectors and not to others?   
The literature on early industrial development in India has emphasized the role played 
by British investment and entrepreneurship. Some scholars see it as a crucial factor in the 
development of an economy scarce in capital, technology and entrepreneurial skills. 
(Buchanan 1966, Anstey 1957) Max Weber claimed that Hinduism dampened the 
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entrepreneurial spirit and led to India’s economic backwardness. (Weber, pp. 111-114) 
Morris criticized Weber, arguing that Indians did become industrial entrepreneurs when 
conditions were attractive. (Morris 1967)  Tripathi sees exposure to western ideas and values 
rather than religion as a determinant of Indian entrepreneurship. (Tripathi 1971) Others have 
emphasized the negative impact British rule in circumscribing the sphere of operation for 
domestic capital. (Bagchi 1972, Ray 1994) This literature emphasizes the discrimination 
faced by Indian business and the favors received by British entrepreneurs from the colonial 
state. These favors included subsidized land transfers to tea planters and legislations in 
support of contracts with indentured workers in these plantations. While this may explain the 
absence of Indian business interests in Calcutta, it does not explain their dominant presence 
in Bombay.  More importantly in does not explain the small presence of British capital in the 
cotton textile industry.   
This paper offers an explanation for the segmented world of industrial investment by 
British and Indian capital. By matching the volumes of investment by industry type to the 
ethnicity of the investors, it argues that informational asymmetries can explain why 
entrepreneurship by ethnic groups was directed towards some activities and not others. 
Access to information about markets differed across social groups and gave an advantage to 
specific groups in specific markets. The role of social networks in long distance trade in 
history is well researched. Less is known about its role in investment.  This paper explores 
the role of social networks in decisions to invest in industry. History plays a role too by 
providing certain “social amenities” for each social group in a given region. Conditional on 
the initial advantage, information flows within a network and advantages of “social 
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amenities” led to a segregation of economic activity by social group and showed up in the 
different investment patterns in the cities of Calcutta and Bombay. 
 
Capital and Entrepreneurship: The Industrial Divide 
Table 1 summarizes colonial India’s industrial divide. Industrial investment in 
Calcutta and Bombay followed divisions of capital and product markets and ethnicity.   Table 
2, shows the ethnic divide across the two cities in the first quarter of the 20
th
 century in 
commercial activity including its industrial sub-sector. The racial and regional divide is 
striking and suggests a chasm between the commercial worlds of the two cities.  Was this 
caused by the history of the two cities or by the informational asymmetries enjoyed by 
different groups in the different industries?  
History vs. information 
The history of the two cities, Bombay and Calcutta differed in terms of the interaction 
of British and Indian commercial interests. Both had seen the rise of British agency houses as 
the trading monopoly of the East India Company ended. While some of them ventured into 
new activities such as coal mining or shipping, their primary involvement was in trade and 
the China trade in cotton and opium was an important component. (Tripathi 2004, pp. 46-48)  
The presence of Indian merchants in the East was small. Indian partnerships with British 
business in joint stock companies such as Carr, Tagore and Company were short lived. 
(Tripathi 2004, pp. 67-74)  In contrast in Western India, the Indian merchants had a long 
history in the trading world, including overseas trade using connections of social networks. 
Their role in the illicit opium trade to China out of the ports in the West shaped their 
economic importance in the region. (Tripathi 2004, pp. 74-76)  With the decline of the trade 
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in opium and shipbuilding in the middle of the 19
th
 century, the communities involved in 
these activities, such as the Parsis, began to look for alternative profitable opportunities.
 
(Bagchi 1997, p.100) 
In the West, Indians had been the brokers
2
  for the East India Company and continued 
be act as the main brokers for the importers of cotton goods for distribution in local markets. 
For jute cloth, however, Indian brokers had a relatively small presence in internal trade until 
the First World War.(Timberg 1978, p. 150) It could well be the case that Indian merchants 
had a special position in Bombay and were able to exploit industrial investment 
opportunities, which they could not in Calcutta. The history in the two cities had generated 
some “social amenities” for the groups in the two places in a lexicographic sense. This 
implies that for a British and Indian entrepreneur there was an advantage being located in a 
place where there were others of his ethnicity. Therefore Bombay held an advantage for the 
Indians and Calcutta for the British. 
 This paper examines the informational advantages or disadvantages enjoyed by 
ethnicity in product and capital markets.  Consider two channels of information flowing 
through social networks. First, potential entrepreneurs might have had information about 
industries depending on their ethnic group’s knowledge of the product market.  Second, 
potential investors, concerned with the risks associated with buying shares in different 
industries might have preferred entrepreneurs with whom they were socially connected.  
In the East, tea and jute were export commodities mainly and the British had a 
valuable informational advantage in these markets.  Not surprisingly the export trade in jute 
and tea was in the hands of British.  Tea was yet to become a popular drink in India. Only 
                                                 
2
 The brokers acted as middleman between the East India Company and the artisans and were paid a percentage 
of the sales. 
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25% of jute output was sold in the domestic market. The story for coal is slightly different:  
demand for coal came from sectors that were dominated by British capital. Railways 
accounted for over 30% of total demand for coal. (Buchanan 1966, p. 264) The cost of 
transporting coal from Bengal to other region remained high in comparison to the price of 
imports and Indian industry used substantial amounts of imported coal. After 1900, the price 
of imported coal increased making Bengal coal competitive in the home market as well as in 
the nearby export markets.(Rungta 1970, pp. 174-75)  Indian owned firms that were in the 
industry were small and produced poorer quality coal that was sold in the local market.  
If we turn to cotton textiles, the pattern reverses. The Indian market for cotton textiles 
was relatively unknown to the average British entrepreneur.  Indian traders had long 
distributed the imports of Lancashire textiles and in doing so had gained knowledge of local 
markets.  These traders became entrepreneurs when the opportunity arose.  Moreover, the 
same traders controlled the sale of raw cotton in Western India and their large profits during 
the cotton famine provided them with the capital they would need. The cotton traders came 
from specific communities, such as the Parsis and the Bhatias, who had a long involvement 
in intra-regional as well as Indian Ocean trade.  The importance of this local knowledge is 
underscored by the fact that of the two British textile producers in India, one had also been 
involved in the cotton trade and the other was set up by a British technician already working 
in the subcontinent. (Tripathi 2004, p. 117)  
From the mid-19
th
 century, changes in company law led to the formation of limited 
liability joint stock companies. (Rungta 1970, pp. 43-45) Companies set up by British 
entrepreneurs raised their capital in Britain and in India. Firms were either floated on the 
London Stock Exchange as sterling companies or in India as rupee companies. The sterling 
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companies raised capital in Britain and their shares traded in London. The rupee companies 
raised capital in India and their shares traded in Bombay and Calcutta. The Brokers’ 
Exchange, as it was known in Calcutta, was entirely European, while Indian brokers were 
dominant in the stock market in Bombay (Rungta 1970, pp. 207-08)   The British firms were 
managed by managing agents secured by long term contracts. These agents held shares in the 
companies they managed and were either London based or the Indian counterparts of the 
British firms. The reputational value of the managing agents was important in the capital 
market. Even if a new firm was unknown to the British investor, the managing agent 
associated with it had a reputation. (Chapman 1992, p.123) The managing agency system 
may be seen as an institutional innovation, which addressed the problem of informational 
constraints in long distance investment by providing a trustworthy name to the British 
investor. This system was universally adopted by British business in Asia. Table 3 shows the 
involvement of several leading managing agents in different industries.  
Both sterling and rupee could raise funds from diverse sources. Investors resident in 
Britain (or elsewhere out of India) invested mainly in railways and public utilities and in tea 
sterling companies.  British expatriates in India (civil servants, army personnel, and business 
people) tended to invest in tea, jute and coal rupee companies. Indian investors could only 
invest in Rupee companies either British or Indian. All investors faced informational 
constraints which could be mitigated by social connection or the reputational value of the 
entrepreneur.  Familiarity with products could also overcome informational constraints faced 
by the potential investors.  
An example of the importance of product market familiarity comes from tea, where 
the product was present in the consumption basket of the average British consumer. Because, 
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Britain was the main market for tea investors were familiar with the product. When the tea 
companies were floated in London in the 1860s and 1870s, they attracted large volumes of 
sterling investment. On the other hand, jute was relatively unknown to the average British 
consumer and jute companies in Scotland might have might have been less risky. Only a 
handful of jute companies were registered in London.  It was a product widely used in India 
for centuries and most of the capital was raised locally from British residents in India looking 
for profitable investment.   
While systematic quantitative evidence is scarce, case studies of individual managing 
agencies indicate that British investors accounted for bulk of the investment.  For Bird and 
Company, nearly 90% of the investment in rupee companies in tea and jute came from 
British investors. (Chapman 1992, p126) The Indian Industrial Commission of 1918 reported 
that the Indian shareholders held just over 15 per cent of the shares of jute companies. 
(Bagchi 1971, p.193) The majority of coal firms were set up and managed by British 
managing agents in India and the investors were British expatriates living in India. Jardine 
Matheson, the managing agent, argued that it was better to issue shares in India where there 
was local knowledge. (Chapman 1992, p.124)  
Indian entrepreneurs in the cotton textile industry relied on their friends and family 
for capital. The Parsis in Bombay subscribed large parts of the authorized capital of new 
companies and had the reputation to attract interest from the public. (Rungta 1970, pp. 59-60) 
When Davar, a Parsi, floated the first cotton mill in 1854, fifty leading traders of Bombay 
provided the initial capital of 500,000 Rupees. Most shareholders were also Parsis, but there 
were others from other Indian social groups as well as two Englishmen. (Morris 1982, p.574) 
Davar himself retained a large stake while other Parsis and Gujaratis subscribed one-third. 
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(Tripathi 2004, p. 97) Outside Bombay raising capital by Indians proved more difficult. 
When Ranchhodlal set up the first cotton mill in Ahmedabad in 1858, most of the shares 
were bought by his friends and family after he failed to raise capital from the local traders. 
(Tripathi and Mehta 1990, pp. 44-45, Rungta 1970, pp. 60-61) Similar situations can be 
found in the case of other textile entrepreneurs in Bombay, such as the Tata family or Bhatia 
merchants. When Tata offered shares to a member of another community, a Marwari trader, 
it was met with skepticism. (Tripathi 2004, p.121) Members of the Bhatia community were 
the main shareholders in companies floated by Thackersey, Morarjee and Khatau, all Bhatia 
merchants. (Tripathi 2004, p.121) In Buckingham Mill, one of the few British cotton textile 
firms, Indian shareholders held only one-tenth of the shares. (Bagchi 1972, p 193)  
Estimates of Investment 
Table 4 shows the breakdown of investment in sterling and rupee companies in 1915.  The 
two largest sectors of investment were tea, dominated by British companies followed by 
cotton textiles dominated by Indian companies.  Data on paid up capital allows us to track 
growth of rupee companies from 1880. Paid-up capital is likely to underestimate total 
investment as enterprises also raised loans from banks and machinery producers. (Morris 
1982, p. 579) British firms also found it relatively easy to borrow from banks in India. (Ibid) 
The omission creates a relative distortion if some sectors had better access to loans. A more 
serious problem is that paid up capital in older firms would be further from real capital 
because of a longer stream of retained earnings. Our information is not detailed enough to 
correct for this.  
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Figure 1 presents the relative position of different sectors in rupee investment. In 1880 tea 
had the largest share. By 1900 there was more investment in cotton textiles than in tea or 
banking and by 1914 cotton textiles was by far the largest sector of Rupee investment.  
Discrimination or Social Networks? 
Discrimination against Indian business has been invoked to explain their absence in 
several major industries. (Bagchi 1972, Ray 1994)  Indian entrepreneurs were shut out of the 
higher echelons of British business in Calcutta.  As late as 1911, less than 4 percent of tea 
company directors were Indians; in jute there were none. (Chapman 1992, p.122) Moreover, 
industrial Associations for tea and jute were exclusive clubs for Europeans.  The London Jute 
Association, for instance, did not accept Indians and therefore acted as a barrier to entry in 
the export market. (Ray 1994)  
A different view of discrimination is that British capital entered those sectors which 
were complementary to their domestic industrial interests. (Sen 1994) But if we take jute, this 
argument does not seem to carry much weight.  Indian jute products were substitutes for 
those produced in Dundee and gained market share. If they were trying to enhance 
manufacturing at home, British entrepreneurs would not have tried to create a rival industry 
in Calcutta.  In fact, British industrial interests were not a homogeneous group. The interest 
of Lancashire textile producers differed from those of machinery producers. There is much 
evidence to suggest a close cooperation between Indian textile entrepreneurs and British 
textile machinery manufacturers. Davar who set up the first textile firm in Bombay, for 
instance, was advised by Platt Bros from Oldham on the type of machinery needed.
3
  British 
machinery makers encouraged the development of foreign textile producers: they offered 
large commissions to promoters and accepted deferred payment.  
                                                 
3
 Rutnagur, Bombay Industries: The Cotton Mills, p9. 
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In the case of discrimination or barriers to entry, rates of return on investment must 
differ across sectors. The sector which had barriers to entry (British dominated export 
industries) should have had higher rates of return. Morris suggests the opposite held: Indians 
focused on high rate of return sectors because traditional activities such as trade and 
commerce already had high returns. The average rate of return in money lending, internal 
trade and real estate transactions was 9-10%. (Tripathi 2004, p80) Indians entered jute only 
after the jute cartel pushed up profits, consistent with view that Indian entrepreneurs required 
a high rate of profit. (Morris 1994, pp. 136-37) Similarly, efforts to raise capital for the 
railways in India had not succeeded. Out of over 50,000 British shareholders in 1870, only 
368 were Indian. (Morris 1967). British investors were inured to modest returns.  Risk 
adjusted returns on investment in the Empire were a bit higher than for investment in 
domestic (English) securities. (Edelstein 1976) Thus it is no surprise that a guaranteed return 
of 5 per cent from Indian railroads was attractive to British middle class investors. 
(Macpherson 1955) Morris’s argument, if correct, might explain why Indians did not invest 
in the industries dominated by the British. However, this view still does explain why British 
investors shunned Indian cotton textiles.  
Informational disadvantage could discourage entry despite other advantages enjoyed 
by British business groups.  Morris was the first to recognize that familiarity with markets 
can explain why the spheres of investment were different for British and Indian capital. 
(Morris 1979) Informational differences gave each social group a different assessment of 
profitability of a sector. Morris argued that Europeans tended to get involved in markets that 
were export oriented or closely supported by the state.(Morris 1982, p. 580) Morris’s 
argument implies that certain barriers to entry operated in the sectors where the Indians were 
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dominant. This contradicts the view that barriers to entry were enforced by privileges of 
colonial connection in the export sector and that there were no barrier to entry in the import 
substituting sector.  Higher rates of return in Indian dominated sectors could only persist if 
there were barrier to entry for British entrepreneurs or investors. There is no evidence of such 
a barrier in the cotton textile industry. The next section proposes an alternative framework, 
where the rates of return equalize across sectors, but entrepreneurship is segregated by 
ethnicity. 
 
Informational Constraints and Social Networks  
 Only a quarter of British capital went to the Empire of which only 30 percent went to 
the colonies under British rule, with India receiving two thirds (or 5% of the whole). (Davis 
and Huttenback 1985)  Lucas, in his well-known paper, argued that British capital flows to 
India were surprisingly low even during the colonial period when the threat of expropriation 
was low and returns were high. (Lucas 1990)  One explanation might be, as Lucas argued, the 
imperial power restricted the volume of investment to keep returns high. This was not the case 
in British India. On the contrary, London encouraged large inflows of capital into Indian 
railways by guaranteeing favorable rates of return. (Thorner 1951)   
 Bovenberg and Gordon set out a model of asymmetric information to explain why 
capital flows do not equalize returns across countries. They consider a situation where 
domestic investors are better informed about the quality of the investment project than 
foreign investors. Foreigners fear being overcharged and hesitate to buy equity. Thus 
asymmetric information between foreign and domestic investors prevents capital from 
flowing to high return economies. (Bovenberg and Gordon 1996)  Analyses of recent cross-
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country equity flows support these implications. (Portes et al 2001) Portes et al. estimate a 
gravity model for capital flows and find that distance has a significant negative effect. The 
results suggest that local producers have better information about local markets and foreign 
firms are reluctant to undertake long distance investment even when political risks are 
minimal.  
Here, I assume information flows better within social groups than across groups. In 
this case members of a community will make similar decisions.  For instance community 
members migrate en masse.  There are many examples of this. Bhatia merchants moved as a 
group from Surat to Bombay as the city began to grow in the 18
th
 century. Tripathi and 
Mehta 1990, p77)  Marwari traders moved as a group from North-western India towards the 
East in search of new business opportunities.(Timberg 1978 pp. 92-93) Before moving to the 
empirical evidence on the effect of social networks on investment and entrepreneurship, let 
us develops a simple framework of informational asymmetry and social network effects to 
structure the discussion. 
Consider two sectors, the export industry and the import substituting industry and two 
ethnic groups:  British and Indian.  The British are favoured by the colonial state, better 
connected to exporting firms, shipping companies, financial institutions, and have better 
knowledge of export markets. The Indians are worse in each of these matters but have better 
local connections and better knowledge of local markets. The distribution of information 
implies that British entrepreneurs favour export industries and Indians favour import 
substituting industries. 
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In this setting we consider two different scenarios: one where barriers to entry cause 
separation by ethnicity and a second where social networks offer additional advantages so 
that an individual strictly prefers locations with more members of his or her ethnic group. 
Scenario 1:  The privileged social group creates barriers to entry using political and social 
connections through say the use of state support or formation of industrial associations.  In 
the context of colonial India, these barriers would affect the export sector but not the import 
substituting sector. Indeed, Indian entrepreneurs did not have access to the export market or 
the London capital market. Moreover British firms were favoured in their access to new 
technology and by legislation had better access to product and factor markets, such as laws of 
indenture in the tea industry, export quotas to aid cartelization in tea or subsidized allocation 
of land.  
In this case the export sector would only have British firms and the import substituting sector 
would be ethnically mixed. Returns in the import substituting industry will be less than or 
equal those of the export industry, as entry barriers operate in one direction.  This may be 
defined as a “hard network”, where segregation in one sector operates through political or 
social entry barriers. This supports the discrimination view. 
Scenario 2:  Individuals derive utility from social or political amenities that have no direct 
business purpose.  Instead   other aspects of life are valued, for instance clubs, religious 
organizations or any non business organization.  History shapes preferences in such a way 
that the menu of desired amenities varies across (but not within) ethnic groups. History also 
produced conformity namely a preference for interactions within a social group. 
(Bikchandani et al 1998, Epstein 2010) We may call these “soft networks.”4 These arise not 
                                                 
4
 Espstein(2010)discusses the role of information cascades and network effects in the context of decisions to 
migrate to the same foreign location from a community, where herd behaviour  causes individuals to ignore 
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due to formal mechanisms of discrimination as in the case of “hard networks”, but due to 
advantages arising from interactions within a social group.  Even then, we suppose that each 
individual always seeks out the sector with the highest rate of economic return and if the 
returns are equalized, only then, factors in the presence of amenities that cater to the ethnic 
group in question. In short, an individual uses economics first, and then extra-economic 
amenities surrounding a sector to decide which sector to invest in.
5
 
Consider the following simple model: say there are an infinite number of potential 
entrants in each of two ethnic groups. There are two sectors, A and B with a large number of 
specific profit opportunities (niches). An entrant in sector i, where i = A or B, will make 
profits given by Pi = fi(mi), where mi is the mass of individuals already in Sector i, and fi is a 
continuous function that decreases to 0 as mi goes to infinity.  
Any initial entrant observes only imperfectly which niche is profitable. The pioneer 
can enter either industry and select a niche. The entrant will earn monopoly profits initially. 
The pioneer gets a signal high or low about each sector and the quality of the signal 
determines the probability that the sector is profitable. The pioneer’s posterior probability 
that the sector is profitable is p if the signal is high and 1-p if the signal is low (p>0.5). 
Followers face competition and congestion, from the initial entrants. Members of a 
community learn the profitability of a niche once another member has made a successful 
entry in that industry, thus entering an industry where another member is already present 
reduces their risk. On the other hand, if an entrepreneur enters an industry whose current 
producers are not from his group gets no informational benefits.  
                                                                                                                                                       
their private signals and network externalities arise due to the presence of  migrants from the same cultural 
background and encourage migration flows driven by “friends and family” 
5
 Munshi (2011) shows social network effect can lead to clusters of entry into a new activity. Early entrants  
invest in social network connections as a sufficiently large group is necessary to benefit from collective entry.   
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Assume for simplicity that in each industry, there are several niches, indexed by i ∈ 
1,2,..,n}. Only one of these niches is profitable, and each of them has equal prior probability. 
Let L be the loss suffered by entering an unprofitable niche. Let Gi be the gain from entering 
a profitable niche in industry i, i∈{A,B}. We assume that Gi is a random variable that is 
independently and identically distributed according to density f on [G ,Ĝ]. 
 At each date t, one individual (drawn at random) chooses to enter a niche. The individual has 
a signal high or low depending on past experience.  
For the first entrant the signal is given at p<1.  Assume that there are no sunk costs 
and that the expected profit from entry (without any additional information), is, pGi+(1-p)L-
c=0  where c is the cost of capital. 
6
  
Let Ĝ such that pĜ+(1-p)L-c=0 is the threshold profit needed for entry. Once an 
individual enters, he finds out whether the niche is actually profitable (and he continues in the 
industry) or not and then he exits at the end of the period. 
For followers the quality of signal depends on who they would be competing with. If 
prior entrants are of their ethnicity the signal is more accurate than if the prior entrants were 
not of the follower’s ethnicity (p is high for the British in the export industries and high for 
the Indian in the import substituting industries).  We make the sensible assumption that (1) if 
someone is producing in the industry, observers know that the industry is profitable. We also 
assume that if for prior entrants of the same ethnicity, the follower learns the specific niche 
the prior entrants have chosen and what profits are. Thus, he now believes that the probability 
that this niche is profitable is 1 rather than p.  As in the models of herd behavior, (Banerjee 
                                                 
6
 Since the posterior probability of success in a niche, where no signal is observed is (1-p)/(n-1), which is 
strictly less than 1/n<p, it is strictly worse to enter a niche where no signal is observed. 
17 
 
1992 and Bikchandani et al 1998) 
7
 the follower will ignore his own information and the 
signal he observes and follow the first entrant. However, in this case, he has to share profits 
with the current incumbent, and his payoff is GA(m)<GB.  
More generally, let Gi(m) denote the profits when m firms are already in the market, 
which is assumed to be decreasing in m. Thus for any value of Gi, there exists m∗ (Gi) such 
that at most m∗ firms can profitably enter. Note that this value of m∗ assumes that firms 
perfectly know which niche is profitable. Therefore, m∗ followers of the same ethnicity as 
the first entrant will be willing to enter.  
Now consider a member of the other community. Even if he receives a high signal, he 
will know with probability p<1 that it is profitable and that he will not earn monopoly profits. 
Suppose he has received a high signal for both industries because he gets no inside 
information, he faces a choice between pGA(m) +(1-p)L-c if he enters the industry of the 
other community and pGB +(1-p)L-c if he pioneers the new industry. He will be a pioneer as 
long as GA(m)<GB. Suppose he has received a high signal for the industry of the other 
community and a low signal for the new industry. He then faces a choice between pGA (m) + 
(1-p) L-c > (1-p) GB +pL-c.  If GB is sufficient large relative GA(m) he will be a pioneer in a 
new industry. Clearly then the most likely case for a mixed industry is if both ethnic groups 
enter early on. 
If he has to choose to be a follower in both industries then his choice is between 
pGA(mA) +(1-p)L-c and GB(mB).  In the absence of massive differences in entry rate he will 
chose industry B where he is better informed.  Under a wide range of conditions, thus, the 
followers prefer to enter industries where they are better informed. A key assumption here is 
                                                 
7
 The model here differs from the models of herd behaviour and the informational cascades as the payoff 
declines with entry. 
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that entry rates  relative to market size are not significantly different across the different 
sectors. If British entry was slower, then the decline in rate of return in the British sectors 
would be slower encouraging outside firms to enter. This assumption is reasonable if early 
entrants invest in social network to build a viable group in the industry as in Munshi (2011). 
Thus consistent with the “soft network” view, industry A and industry B’s 
entrepreneurs are likely to be segregated and if these entrepreneurs are located in distinct 
regions of the country industries will arise in different locations.  If groups are large enough 
that entry drives profits down, in the long run rates of return will equalize unless outside 
options are different. 
The soft networks model generates complete segregation and also the equalization of 
the rates of return across sectors. A model of hard networks can also generate complete 
segregation, but there is no reason why the rates of return should be equalize across sectors.  
This is a testable hypothesis to be taken up in the following section. If economic returns are 
not systematically higher in the export sector, then the discrimination view represented by 
hard networks may be questioned and the effect of soft networks with informational 
asymmetry is more plausible. 
The model assumes that the profitability of the industries is stationary over time and 
varies only with the number of entrants. This is a simplification and the model can be 
extended to allow for the profit opportunities to change over time across industries. It can be 
modeled by assuming that Gi (m) fluctuates.  In this case it may become unprofitable for a 
new follower to invest in his home industry even if perfectly informed. He may prefer to 
invest in the other industry even if he is less informed. Similarly rising profitability of an 
industry may induce members of the other community to enter even in the absence of full 
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information.  The logic applies both to entrepreneurs and to investors. Indeed high dividends 
could encourage “outsiders” to buy shares even if they were not socially connected to the 
entrepreneur.  The size of the group of “outsiders” can increase though information flow 
within the social network and once the share ownership reaches a critical minimum, it can 
encourage entry into the industry from that social group. The jute industry is a case in point.  
Marwari Jute traders  began to acquire shares in British firms during the First World War and 
entered as entrepreneurs in the 1920s. The Marwaris did not take over British firms, but set 
up new firms. As predicted by Munshi’s framework, (2011) in this case too, several firms 
from a social network entered at the same time and became a viable group. With this 
framework in mind, I turn to the empirical exercise. 
 
Empirical Strategy 
Knowing that investment and entrepreneurship was segregated I examine whether 
rates of return differed across export and import substituting sectors. I also try to rule out 
explanations that suggest barriers to entry.  If discrimination against Indian capital or the 
privileges enjoyed by British capital explain the different spheres investment, then it should 
be possible to measure economic attributes that differ across export and import substituting 
industries 
Hard vs. Soft Network 
The first test addresses returns. With hard networks, rates of return will differ across 
industries, but they might equalize with soft networks.  Further with hard networks, profit rates 
should be higher in the export (British) sector.  Existing estimates suggest an average rate of 
profit of 9 percent in jute, an export industry and 10 percent in cotton textiles, an import 
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substituting industry. (Morris 1982, p. 572)  In this paper, profits rates in 1910 for four industries 
are constructed using firm level data (see Table 5).  There were no systematic differences in 
profits across export and import substituting sectors. Cotton and jute showed comparable mean 
profit rates, while tea had a higher return. Coal shows a much lower profit rate with the median 
firm making no profit. Higher dividends were paid in tea, but comparable rates were paid in jute 
and cotton, which are comparable industries.  If lower median profit rate discouraged British 
business in cotton, this was clearly not the case in coal. Lastly, I examine profit rate and dividend 
rates for British and Indian firms in the cotton textiles industry. Indian firms show a lower profit 
rate compared to British firms, but paid out higher dividends. A T test shows that these 
differences are not statistically significant. 
Measuring constraints  
 The next step is to ask if Indian entrepreneurs were prevented from entering certain 
industries. First, did the minimum efficient scale differ across sectors?  If Indian entrepreneurs 
had a disadvantage in raising capital through the stock market or had limited access to credit 
from the formal British owned banking sector, they would be more likely to enter industries 
where the initial capital outlay was lower. If scale economies did not matter then, in any given 
industry, firms started by Indians would tend to be smaller.  Both propositions are tested using 
firm- level data. 
Table 6 presents comparative paid-up capital from different industries using both 
aggregate data from Rungta and firm–level information from various sources.8 It shows that 
the average paid up capital in cotton mills was lower compared than for an average jute mill 
                                                 
8
Morris suggests that initial investment in jute was about the same if not lower than the setting up cost in an 
average cotton mill and could not have deterred entry. Morris uses Rungta’s estimates paid- up capital of Rs 
933,000 in 1881 and Rs 1.5 million in 1901 in an average jute mill.
 
  However Rungta’s data on cotton textiles 
show that the average paid- up capital in cotton mills was less than Rs 900,000 in both years. 
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from the 1880s to 1910. However, the average coal or tea firm was smaller than the average 
cotton firm. The absence of Indians in these sectors indicates a relatively minor role of a 
capital constraint. Table 7 focuses on the two comparable industries cotton and jute and 
provides measures of machinery used and employment. Although the machinery employed is 
not directly comparable across the two sectors, looms are required in both for weaving. Many 
cotton firms produced a large quantity of yarn as the finished product. Therefore cotton 
textile firms count both spindles and looms and aggregates them on the basis 30 spindles per 
loom equivalent.  Although the loom equivalent is higher for cotton mills, jute firms 
employed significantly more labor. This seeming anomaly is partly due to the aggregation 
problem. About two hundred spindles could be operated by one worker whereas one worker 
attended to one loom. Both capital outlay and number of workers were higher in the jute firm. 
The firm size and the minimum efficient scale could have given Indian entrants a 
disadvantage if they were capital constrained.  However, it has already been noted that such 
an argument cannot be used to explain the absence of Indian entrepreneurs in tea and coal. 
The second test for capital constraints is to see if there is difference in size between 
British and Indian firms, in industries where they co-exist. If capital constraint was 
systematically greater for Indians than their firms would be smaller than British owned ones.  
Firms are compared within the industries: cotton and jute. Note that Indians were the majority 
group in cotton, but a minority in jute and the opposite holds for the jute industry. This 
procedure has the advantage that it can use a physical measure of capital, the loom 
equivalent, rather than a value measure, since it only makes intra industry comparisons.
 
On 
the basis of the measure of loom equivalent and looms, comparisons can be made across 
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firms according to ownership for the year 1924.
9
  Table 8 shows that in each industry, the 
majority group always has the larger firms, although the difference is not statistically 
significant. In the cotton textile industry in Bombay, the Indian firms on average were larger 
than the British firms, while in the jute industry, British firms were larger. Thus the initial 
hypothesis, that Indians were uniformly more capital constrained, is not borne out. Instead it 
appears that the minority group might have faced more difficulty in raising capital.
 10
  If 
capital had been a constraint for Indian firms, then British firms would tend to be larger in all 
sectors. I compute the capital- labor ratio in mills run by different communities in cotton 
textiles in Bombay to test for systematic differences. The ratio was similar across all other 
groups and the British firms were not more capital intensive. (See table 8)  
One reason for this lack of difference in the capital labor ratio is that beyond the formal 
banking sector, Indian entrepreneurs could raise capital through indigenous networks that had 
grown wealthy in trade.  Indian cotton textiles entrepreneurs had often made money in trade, 
particularly during the cotton famine of the 1860s. The capital to set up the first cotton mills was 
raised by Parsi entrepreneurs from their own resources and contribution from family and friends. 
The Bhatia merchants, who were the first Hindu entrepreneurs, also raised their own finances. 
(Rutnagur 1927, p. 46)  At least 70% of the authorized capital was paid up soon after the firm 
was set up. Small firms tended remain closely held and issue a small number of high value 
shares. Large firms tended to float of low face-value shares to a larger number of investors. 
(Rungta 1970, pp. 59-60) In 1854 raising capital for a cotton mill in Bombay did not prove 
difficult, Oriental Mills sold 500 shares of Rupees 2500 each, but it had to limit subscription to 
                                                 
9
 The year 1924 was chosen as there was a significant group of Indian firms in the jute industry by this period. 
10
 Banerjee and Munshi (2004) show that in recent times capital stock is higher for firms owned by members of 
a local social network in the garment industry in Tirupur in Southern India, compared firms owned by 
“outsiders” who do not have access to local credit networks 
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four share per person due to high demand. (Morris 1982, p. 575) On the other hand, British firms 
in cotton textiles held little attraction in the Bombay capital market. Greaves, Cotton & 
Company, the largest European managing agent, controlled seven spinning mills but it was 
unable to raise capital to diversify into weaving. (Morris 1982, p. 579) European capital was no 
more than 10-20% of total capital invested in cotton. In Calcutta, the average jute or tea firm did 
not face problems in mobilizing capital.  
There is, thus, no evidence that Indian entrepreneurs were drawn to industries with 
particularly high rates of returns as suggested by Morris, or that export sectors had higher returns 
as predicted by the claim of barriers to entry, or that capital constraints alone determined the 
industrial divide between British and Indian capital.   
  
Social Network Effects 
The role of social networks in economic activity in Sub- Saharan Africa has been 
highlighted by Fafchamps when information about the market is limited and involves search 
costs.(Fafchamps 2004, pp16-17) Traders in Madagascar depend on family ties when starting 
businesses and but in the long run they reduce themselves from such dependence. 
(Fafchamps and Minten 1999)  In contemporary India, the effect of social network in entry 
has been explored in the context of the diamond industry. Entry of a few members of a social 
group from outside the trade generated further entry by others from the same 
community.(Munshi 2011) In 19
th
 century India too, community ties were important in 
decisions to enter into industrial activity. Caste and community networks had been important 
in Indian Ocean trade in the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries.(Ray 1985) These same ties formed the 
basis of industrial investment.  Given the non- formal structure of dissemination of 
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information about markets, the community was a relatively costless way to acquire 
information about new markets and opportunities. The cotton textile and jute industries 
provide suitable context to study the role of social networks in the early stages of India’s 
industrialization. In cotton textiles, there were broadly five social networks: Parsis, Hindus, 
Muslims, Jews and Europeans. The Hindu community was represented by specific trading 
castes, such as the Bhatias. The social diversity within the Indian firms allows us to identify 
common factors that might explain their entrepreneurial qualities. 
Was the common factor greater contact with western society and higher level of 
human capital? Tripathi argues that the exposure to new ideas and values and a desire to learn 
western industrial practices was common to the pioneers from different 
communities.(Tripathi 1997, p. 108) Parsis were the first social group to become industrial 
entrepreneurs. As a community, the Parsis had fewer barriers to interacting with other groups 
and on foreign travel, which gave them greater contact with western society.
11
 They were 
among the most educated in Indian society. (White 1995, Desai 1994)  The first Hindu textile 
entrepreneur in Bombay, Khatau Makanji belonged to the Bhatia community; they had links 
with the Parsis and the community played an important role in the religious reform 
movement of the 1870s. Mulji Thackersey, one of the leaders, visited England and admired 
Western industrial values. (Tripathi 1997, p. 109)  Ranchhodlal, who set up the first cotton 
mill in Ahmedabad was educated in English and became a civil servant. (Tripathi and Mehta 
1990, p. 41) If education and western contact were the driving factors, then human capital 
should be the common factor among the pioneers rather than the social network. The first 
entrants were Parsis and as a community they enjoyed higher level of human capital 
compared to other Indian caste and community groups. Yet, the success of the Parsi firms 
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 Hindus had religious restrictions on foreign travel 
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had little impact on the traditional Hindu business groups until 1875. (Morris 1982, pp580-
81) Instead, after Khatau Makanji opened a cotton mill, others Hindus followed. (Tripathi 
1997, p108) The majority of the Hindu mills in Bombay belonged to the Bhatia merchants. 
This was the second community to enter the industry.  
The Parsis and the Bhatias shared a history of involvement in cotton trade. The Parsis 
had made their wealth in opium and cotton trade. The Bhatias came from Gujarat and traded 
in raw cotton, textiles, and grain. Ranchhodlal, came from a different social background and 
entry into the cotton textile industry had a different outcome. His caste group, which did not 
have an involvement in cotton trade, did not follow.  Cotton traders in the city of Ahmedabad 
from other social networks did not follow either. Jains cotton traders turned Ranchhodlal 
down when he approached them for funds. It took them and their traditional rivals, the 
Vaishnava Banias another couple of decades to move into this industry. (Mehta 1991, p196)  
Cotton and opium trade was also common history among the pioneers from other 
social groups. David Sassoon, a Jewish entrepreneur, had migrated from Baghdad to Bombay 
and prospered in the opium trade. (Rutnagur 1927, p. 58)  He was a pioneer in his 
community. One of the main British companies, Greaves & Cotton, was set up in 1863 by 
James Greaves, who had been involved in the cotton trade in Gujarat and had extensive 
knowledge of the local markets. George Cotton was an agent of the East India Company and 
was also involved in the cotton trade. Greaves & Cotton and Bradbury & Brady were the 
managing agents of twelve out of fifteen British enterprises in cotton. (Morris 1982, p580) 
The development of railway lines, made the internal trade in cotton, long dominated by 
Indian merchants, more accessible to the British companies. (Vicziany 1975, pp370-372) 
Currimbhoys were Muslim merchants in the Indian Ocean trade although they did not act as 
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agents of the English merchants. (Ray 1994, p43) The success of the Parsis and Gujarati 
communities in Bombay might have been a consequence of the less imposing presence of the 
British in the commercial sector rather than religion and Western education. (Guha 1984) 
This view does not contradict the idea of informational advantage arising from participation 
in economic activity. 
Indians had far less business presence in Calcutta. The Marwaris of eastern Indian 
traded in jute, rice, and other agricultural commodities. Although the Marwaris worked 
closely with British firms, they did not enter industrial activity before the First World War. 
Bengalis with western education did enter into partnerships with British businessmen in 
banking, insurance and shipping in the early decades of the 19
th
 century, but then they 
disappeared after the middle of the 19
th
 century.  It was then that the Marwaris emerged as 
the main brokers to the British companies. Timberg documents the rise of the Marwaris as 
moving from trades in futures market in opium, and specie, to trade in raw jute and jute 
products in Calcutta and finally to industrial entrepreneurs.
 
(Timberg 1978, pp161-66) After 
1900, Marwaris organized large firms in the trade in raw jute, and then branched into 
industry two decades later. (Goswami 1991, pp. 84-85) The Marwaris started to buy shares in 
British owned jute firms registered in Calcutta that paid high dividends. They also gave loans 
to cash strapped British firms in return for block shares. The entry of the Marwaris into 
British firms’ boardrooms reduced the British dominance of the industry. (Goswami 1991, 
pp106-09) Birla and Hukumchand invested their wartime profits from jute trade in the first 
two Indian- owned jute mills in Calcutta and they were followed by several other Marwaris 
in the 1920s. In jute Indian entry followed the same pattern as in cotton:  social groups 
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moving from trade to industry within a sector.   All this highlights the role market expertise 
in entrepreneurship and the role of social networks in information sharing.  
The information remains qualitative but the cotton textile industry does allow us to 
put some numbers on the role of the social network as a determinant of entry. Five different 
communities, including the British were involved in cotton with Parsis and Hindus making 
the largest investments. The entry of different groups happened in clusters suggesting strong 
network effects and is shown in figure 2. The entry 97 firms between 1850 and 1915 are used 
to test if there is an association between the presence of community members in the industry 
and entry. Table 9 presents the probability of entry. It shows an association between the 
cumulative presence of members of a community and entry. Total number of firms in the 
industry also increased the probability of entry, but the coefficient is smaller, confirming that 
social network effect mattered for decisions of entry.  In the jute industry too, for the first 
fifty years, the British firms were the only social group. Table 2 shows that all firms in 1915 
were British. In 1929 over 20 percent of the firms were Indian owned and they had all been 
set up by Marwari traders after 1916. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has argued that informational asymmetry contributed to the industrial 
divide between British and Indian business. Geographical factors can explain the location of 
tea, jute and coal in the hinterland of Calcutta and the cotton textile industry in Bombay. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that discrimination against Indian business reduced their access 
to capital and certain product markets.  However discrimination cannot explain the 
overwhelming presence of the Indians in cotton textiles and the insignificant presence of 
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British business in this sector when rates of return did not differ systematically between 
export and import substituting industries.  The involvement of British entrepreneurs in the 
export oriented industries and their limited presence in the main import substituting industry 
is best explained by informational asymmetries and social network effects rather than 
discrimination.  The paper argues that this divide reflects the nature of the two product 
markets, local versus international, and highlights the importance of informational constraints 
in determining flows of entrepreneurship and capital.  Conditional on the initial asymmetry, 
social networks effects produced in segregation by economic activity. 
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Table 1: Dominant Source of Capital and Entrepreneurship by Industry (1914) 
 
INDUSTRY PRIMARY 
ENTREPRENEURS 
MAIN 
INVESTORS 
PRIMARY 
REGION 
TEA BRITISH 
 
BRITISH  IN 
BRITAIN 
CALCUTTA 
JUTE BRITISH BRITISH  IN INDIA CALCUTTA 
COAL BRITISH BRITISH  IN INDIA CALCUTTA 
COTTON 
TEXTILES 
INDIAN INDIAN BOMBAY 
NO. OF JOINT STOCK COMPANIES IN THE CITY AND HINTERLAND 
 CALCUTTA BOMBAY INDIA 
TEA 376 0 385 
JUTE 54 0 55 
COAL 225 5 232 
COTTON 
TEXTILES 
18 178 227 
Source: Statistical Abstract of British India. 
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Table 2: Percentage shares of communities in enterprises: Bombay and Calcutta. 
BOMBAY: ALL COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES 
1 
 
Year European Parsi Hindu Muslim Jewish 
1911 44 22 26 5 0 
1920 19 25 48 6 0 
BOMBAY: COTTON MILLS
2
 
1915 14 30 22 13 20 
1925 13 27 23 18 17 
CALCUTTA: 
1
 ALL COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES 
Year European Bengali Marwari Parsi Muslim 
1875 66 03 0 3 1 
1890 66 12 2 2 2 
1911 55 29 5 2 1 
1920 42 36 10 5 1 
CALCUTTA: JUTE MILLS
3
 
1915 100 0 0 0 0 
1929 78 0 22 0 0 
Note: Shares in total number of enterprises. 
Source: 
1
Calculated from Bagchi, 1997, pp98 & 105   
2
Calculated from Rutnagur 1926, p54, 
2
 Calculated from Goswami, 1992, pp 99-100 &107 
 
33 
 
 
 
Table 3: Control by the Top British Managing Agents in 1911- 14 
(No of Companies) 
 
Managing Agent Tea Jute Coal 
 Sterling  Rupee Sterling  Rupee Sterling Rupee 
Andrew Yule & Co  10  6  11 
Begg Dunlop & Co  10  2   
Bird & Co    8  11 
Davenport & Co  8     
Duncan Bros 6 12     
James Finlay 5     2 
Jardine Skinner & C0  2  2  2 
McLeod 5      
Octavious Steel & Co 13 10     
Planters’ Stores & Agency 6 1     
Shaw Wallace & Co 5 2    11 
Thomas Duff   4    
Williamson Magor  & Co 18 10    5 
Total 124 88 4 29  87 
Source: Bagchi (1972) , Tables 6.5 and 6.6, based on Investors’ India Year Book 
1911 and Tea Producing Companies 1914 
Note: There were many smaller agents, some managing one company in any one 
sector and more in others, some concentrated in one particular sector. 
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Table 4: Sterling and Rupee Investment in 1914-15 (£m) 
COMPANIES STERLING RUPEE TOTAL 
TEA 19.7   2.9 22.6 
COTTON 0.4 13.0 13.9 
JUTE 2.7 7.8 10.5 
GOLD 2.3 0.3 2.4 
COTTON&JUTE 
PRESS 
1.2 1.2 2.4 
TOTAL 27.4 29.0 56.9 
Source: Chapman(1992) based on Indian Industrial Commission, II, p854, p123. 
 
 
Table 5: Profit Rate and Dividend across Sectors in 1910 
Sector Profit Rate (%) Ordinary Dividend (%) 
 Mean(S.D) Median Mean (S.D) Median 
Jute  12 (12.9) 10 5.5 (0.05) 5 
Tea 16 (14.0) 12 12 (10.5) 10 
Coal 4 (13.9) 0 6.4 (16.0) 0 
Cotton 10 (19.0) 4 5.7 (6.6) 5 
Indian firms 9.4 (15.8)  6.6 (7.3)  
British firms 11.6 (25.6)  3.6 (4.1)  
Source: Investors’ India Year Books 1911-1913 
Note: Profit Rate is calculated as a ratio of net profit and paid- up capital 
 
 
 
Table 6: Average Paid-up Capital of Rupee Companies, Rupees ‘000 
 Cotton Tea  Jute Coal 
1881
a
 
 
688  
(28) 
244  
(113) 
958  
(8) 
649  
(6) 
1889
 b
 876 
(99) 
   
1891
a
 
 
852 
(57) 
253 
(144) 
1071 
(11) 
560 
(11) 
1900
 a
 
 
889 
(66) 
246 
(135) 
1444 
 (21) 
 411 
(34) 
1910
 c
 1575 
(43) 
339 
(87) 
3350 
(29) 
614 
(87) 
Source: 
a 
Based on
 Rungta’s industry level information, 1970 Appendix 17 
b 
Based on firm
 
level information from Bombay Millowners Association Report, 1889,
 
c
 Based on firm- level information from Investors’ India Year Book for 1911 
Note: figures in parenthesis indicate the number of firms. 
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Table 7:  Looms and Employment in Cotton and Jute Textiles 
Year No. of mills Average no. of loom 
equivalent/ looms per mill 
Average no. 
employed per mill 
Cotton    
1883-84 79 1043 60 
1893-94 142 1067 130 
1903-04 191 1121 185 
1913-14 271 1210 260 
Jute    
1883-84 23 267 2081 
1893-94 28 342 2471 
1903-04 38 484 3260 
1913-14 64 563 3379 
1926-27  554 3605 
1936-37  621 2765 
Source: Loom Equivalent for Cotton has been calculated using data from Morris 1982, p576 
Jute is based on Morris 1982, p569, 615.  
Notes: For cotton, we aggregate looms and spindles into a loom-equivalent by multiplying 
spindles by 0.033, and adding the number of looms. See Gupta (2011) for details of the 
estimation.  
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Table 8: Average Machinery and Employment by Category of Owner, 1924 
 Number of 
firms 
Looms/Loom 
Equivalent 
 per firm 
Workers  
per firm 
Average 
capital-
labor ratio 
Cotton firms  
in Bombay 
67 2516   
Indian 55 2615* 1929 1.14 
British 12 2061* 1773 1.13 
Jute firms  
in Calcutta 
54 961   
Indian 8 823**   
British 46 985** 
(0.78) 
  
Notes: * T- statistic for the difference between these numbers is 1.4 (not significant at 5% 
level). ** T- statistic for the difference between these numbers is 0.8 (not significant at 5% 
level). 
Source: Bombay Cotton Mills’ Association Report for 1934, Investors India Year Book for 
1934, Jute Mills Review 1935 
Notes: For cotton, we aggregate looms and spindles into a loom-equivalent by multiplying 
spindles by 0.033, and adding the number of looms. See Gupta (2011) for details of the 
estimation. The regional average in table 5 is computed from the aggregate data. The group 
averages have been computed by regressing loom equivalent/loom on ownership, within each 
industry. 
 
Table 9: Probability of Entry  
 
Dependent Variable: Entry  
 Specification 
1 
Specification 
2 
Specification 
3 
    
Cumulative 
Group 
Presence 
.73 (.07)**  0.54 (.10)** 
Total  Firms  0.13 (.03)** 0.14 (.04)** 
Social Group 
Effect 
Yes   Yes 
Year Effect Yes  Yes 
Log 
Likelihood 
-381.1 -386.5 -374.7 
Source: Bombay Cotton Mill’s Association Reports, Rungta, 1929, and Rutnagur 
Note: The model is estimated as an unbalanced panel Probit, Social groups are numbered as 
follows: 1. Parsi, 2.Hindu 3. English, 4. Jewish and 5. Muslim.   
Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis. Cumulative group presence is the total number of 
firms from the social group. 
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FIGURE 1: RUPEE INVESTMENT IN DIFFERENT SECTORS, 1880-1914 
 
Source: Rungta, The Rise of Business Corporations, p 296-29 for 1880-1900  
 
38 
 
 
Figure 2: Entry by Social Group 
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Note: Comm No. lists social groups 1. Parsi, 2. Hindu, 3. English, 4. Jewish and  
 5. Muslim 
Source: Calculations based on Rutnagur 1927, pp. 9-23. 
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